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ABSTRACT
LockDoc is an approach to extract locking rules for kernel
data structures from a dynamic execution trace recorded
while the system is under a benchmark load. These locking
rules can e.g. be used to locate synchronization bugs. For
high rule precision and thorough bug finding, the approach
heavily depends on the choice of benchmarks: They must
trigger the execution of asmuch code as possible in the kernel
subsystem relevant for the targeted data structures. However,
existing test suites such as those provided by the Linux Test
Project (LTP) only achieve – in the case of LTP – about 35
percent basic-block coverage for the VFS subsystem, which
is the relevant subsystem when extracting locking rules for
filesystem-related data structures.
In this article, we discuss how to complement the LTP
suites to improve the code coverage for our LockDoc scenario.
We repurpose syzkaller – a coverage-guided fuzzer with the
goal to validate the robustness of kernel APIs – to 1) not
aim for kernel crashes, and to 2) maximize code coverage
for a specific kernel subsystem. Thereby, we generate new
benchmark programs that can be run in addition to the LTP,
and increase VFS basic-block coverage by 26.1 percent.
KEYWORDS
Test Generation, Kernel Test Coverage, Basic-Block Cover-
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1 INTRODUCTION
Over a period of more than a decade, the Linux kernel un-
derwent a transformation from Linux 2.0’s coarse-grained
and sturdy Big Kernel Lock Bovet and Cesati [1] to more
and more fine-grained synchronization on the granularity
of kernel subsystems and even single data structures Bovet
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and Cesati [1], Love [11], Russell [14]. While reducing lock
contention and scaling better to multi- and many-core plat-
forms, fine-grained locking is error-prone and has led to
numerous synchronization bugs in the past. This situation is
exacerbated by incomplete, inconsistent and in parts faulty
locking documentation.
Our LockDoc approach Lochmann et al. [10] addresses
these issues by tracing locking patterns and data-structure
accesses in a running Linux kernel under load, and deriving
locking rules – i.e., which locks in which particular order
must be taken to access a specific data-structure element –
from this trace. The derived locking rules can consequently
be used to validate or generate documentation, and to lo-
cate synchronization bugs. However, locking-rule quality
and the capability to find bugs also in remote parts of the
kernel heavily depends on how the system is put under load
– i.e. on the choice of benchmark programs that trigger the
execution of kernel code by invoking system calls. Focusing
on the Linux kernel’s Virtual File System (VFS) subsystem
in our LockDoc study Lochmann et al. [10], we relied on
a filesystem-specific subset of the Linux Test Project (LTP)
Hrubis et al. [4], Larson [7] benchmark suites to provoke
lock operations for and accesses to VFS data structures.
However, when we actually measure basic-block test cov-
erage in Linux with kcov Vyukov [18] while running all LTP
suites that even remotely seem to be related to VFS, our
results indicate that only about 35 percent of the kernel’s
basic blocks associated with the VFS subsystem are actually
executed. Although it is not reasonable to expect 100 percent
coverage – e.g., depending on the kernel configuration there
may be several filesystems compiled in that are not associ-
ated with an actual mount point on the test system – there
is certainly room for improvement.
In this article, we propose an approach to increase kernel-
code coverage for LockDoc: We repurpose syzkaller Vyukov
[17], a coverage-guided fuzzer with the goal to validate the
robustness of kernel APIs, to not aim for kernel crashes but
only for basic-block coverage in a particular kernel subsys-
tem. The thereby generated new benchmark programs can
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be run in addition to the LTP suites, and increase VFS basic-
block coverage by 26.1 percent from 34.7 percent (LTP only)
to 43.8 percent (LTP + generated benchmarks).
To summarize, the contributions of this article are:
• A quantitative analysis of the LTP’s capability to trig-
ger code execution in Linux’s VFS subsystem (Sec. 3).
• An approach to repurpose a coverage-guided kernel
fuzzer to generate benchmark programs that target
a particular kernel subsystem and do not crash the
system (Sec. 3).
• An evaluation demonstrating that the combination
of LTP and generated benchmark programs covers
significantly more VFS basic blocks than LTP alone
(Sec. 4).
Sec. 2 discusses related work, and Sec. 5 concludes the paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
Linux-kernel test coverage has been a research topic since
Linux’s very early days. Iyer Iyer [5] analyzes the LTP’s
coverage of Linux 2.4 kernel code with GCOV, and reports
that parts of the fs/ kernel source-code subtree have line-
coverage values between 0.0 (especially for most of the actual
filesystem implementations) and 29.5 percent (for the generic,
filesystem-agnostic part). Larson Larson et al. [8] distills de-
tailed HTML reports fromGCOV results obtained from Linux
2.5, reports that the LTP covers about 90 percent of all kernel
basic blocks that are executed by a much larger benchmark
corpus, and concludes that coverage results should drive fur-
ther LTP development. Yoshioka Yoshioka [19] describes a
Linux regression test framework named crackerjack and the
accompanying branch-coverage test tool btrax, and demon-
strates coverage advantages over LTP. The Lachesis approach
Claudi and Dragoni [2] by Claudi and Dragoni provides a
test suite focusing on real-time extensions for Linux.
While OS-kernel fuzzing approaches date back to at least
1991 with Le’s tsys Le [9] or to 2006 with trinity by Jones et
al. Jones et al. [6], modern kernel-fuzzing approaches like
Vyukov’s syzkaller Vyukov [17] are coverage-guided. For
example, Nossum and Casasnovas Nossum and Casasnovas
[13] port the prominent user-mode fuzzer AFL to the kernel
and uncover filesystem bugs. DIFUZE by Corina et al. Corina
et al. [3] fuzzes kernel drivers to detect bugs, and is aided by
static analysis that determines the necessary input structure.
Schumilo et al.’s kernel AFL (kAFL) Schumilo et al. [15] is a
target-OS agnostic fuzzing approach based on a hypervisor
and hardware support in the form of Intel’s processor trace
feature. Shi et al. Shi et al. [16] demonstrate the practical
application of existing kernel-fuzzing tools to several Linux
versions, and provide an overview of several other kernel-
fuzzing approaches.
To the best of our knowledge, the approach described in
this paper is the first to repurpose coverage-guided kernel
fuzzing to generate benchmarks that complement existing
test suites.
3 APPROACH
The quality of LockDoc’s results heavily depends on the num-
ber of observed lock operations and data-structure accesses
Lochmann et al. [10]. Due to static-analysis limitations (e.g.
pointer aliasing), it is generally infeasible to statically iden-
tify all code locations that make such accesses. For similar
reasons it is generally infeasible to statically determine all
contexts from which these code locations are called, and
consequently, which locks are possibly held when the data-
structure accesses are made. LockDoc therefore resorts to
dynamic analysis, i.e. the observation of the running kernel
under a benchmark load. As LockDoc focuses on the VFS
subsystem to determine locking rules e.g. for the inode data
structure, the problem at hand therefore is to find and run
benchmarks that maximize kernel-code coverage for this
particular subsystem.
The literature proposes several metrics for code coverage,
e.g., path, branch or line coverage Myers et al. [12], Zhu et al.
[20]. For this paper, we chose basic-block coverage over line
coverage, because it better captures the actual fraction of the
code that is being executed. One line of code, for example,
can be mapped to several basic blocks. Hence, having one
particular line covered does not necessarily mean all basic
blocks are covered. Inversely, covering all basic blocks means
all lines of code that have been compiled are covered.
For the Linux kernel, there is already a good starting point
for executing a large fraction of kernel code: the Linux Test
Project (LTP) Hrubis et al. [4], Larson [7], of which we al-
ready used a VFS-related subset for earlier work on LockDoc
Lochmann et al. [10]. LTP’s aim is to “validate the reliability,
robustness, and stability of Linux” Hrubis et al. [4]. It consists
of several individual tests that are grouped into test suites.
Each of these suites targets a particular subsystem or a par-
ticular kernel functionality such as the IPC mechanism or
the VFS subsystem. The scope of the tests ranges from stress
testing to regression testing. Since those tests are manually
composed, only a limited subset of each system call’s param-
eter space can be covered, resulting in a limited amount of
code coverage.
The VFS-related LTP test suites generate a basic-block
coverage of 34.7 percent for the VFS subsystem. We deter-
mined the coverage for each test individually of the fol-
lowing test suites1: dio, fcntl-locktests, filecaps, fs, fs_ext4,
fs_perms_simple, fsx, io, and syscalls. As the fs_readonly suite
only runs a subset of fs on a read-only mounted filesystem,
1We use git tag 20190115 of the LTP repository.
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Test Suite # Tests Covered VFS BBs (%)
dio 30 8312 11.0%
fcntl-locktests 1 2420 3.2%
filecaps 1 2518 3.3%
fs 65 17 495 23.2%
fs_ext4 4 13 081 17.3%
fs_perms_simple 18 5081 6.7%
fsx 1 6572 8.7%
io 2 6817 9.0%
syscalls 1181 24 217 32.1%
Total 1303 26 229 34.7%
Table 1: Covered basic blocks for each LTP test suite
in the VFS subsystem. In total, our Linux 4.10 kernel
build consists of 342,732 basic blocks, and the VFS sub-
system of 75,531 basic blocks, respectively.
we skipped it. Tab. 1 shows the number of VFS basic blocks
covered by each suite.
The numbers indicate that there is still room for coverage
improvement – and, hence, higher LockDoc precision and
bug-finding effectiveness. It turns out that fuzzing (see Sec. 2)
in its coverage-guided feedback variant already has coverage
maximization as one of its main goals. A coverage-guided
kernel fuzzer that recently came to fame is Vyukov’s syzkaller
Vyukov [17], which fuzzes the Linux kernel by randomly
generating user programs that use the system-call interface.
For each generated program (see an example in Listing 1),
syzkaller determines the resulting basic-block coverage. Only
programs that cover at least one new basic block are stored
in the database. syzkaller’s objective is to trigger kernel bugs,
and to minimize the program that triggered the bug.
We modified syzkaller to 1) ignore programs triggering
a bug, and to 2) only store programs that increase the cov-
erage in the VFS subsystem. We furthermore disabled a set
of system calls that are not related to the VFS to improve
fuzzing speed. The resulting programs are intended to cover
more code, and thus cover more memory accesses, which
in turn can be used by LockDoc. Note that these generated
benchmark programs cannot (directly) be used as regression
tests for the kernel, as they do not make any explicit output
that can be used to determine test success.
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we first present our evaluation setup in Sec. 4.1,
and then show our results in Sec. 4.2.
int main(void)
{
syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x1ffff000, 0x1000, 0, 0x32,
-1, 0);
syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000, 0x1000000, 7, 0
x32, -1, 0);
syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x21000000, 0x1000, 0, 0x32,
-1, 0);
*(uint32_t*)0x20002480 = 0x20000340;
memcpy((void*)0x20000340, "\x12", 1);
*(uint32_t*)0x20002484 = 1;
*(uint32_t*)0x20002488 = 0;
syz_read_part_table(0, 1, 0x20002480);
return 0;
}
Listing 1: An excerpt of a program generated by
fuzzing the Linux Kernel using Syzkaller [17].
4.1 Setup
We conduct our experiments on an x86 64-bit Linux Kernel
4.10. The kernel is built without module support, and uses a
minimal kernel configuration: Network support is active as
well as the essential drivers for the root filesystem and for
running in a paravirtualized QEMU -based virtual machine.
To record the executed basic blocks, we enabled a kernel fea-
ture called kcov Vyukov [18], which was initially introduced
by syzkaller Vyukov [17].
The syzkaller modifications2 mentioned in Sec. 3 include
disabling 191 system calls that are not related to VFS, e.g.
those for process control, memory operations, or network
operations. Based on an example given by syzkaller, we im-
plemented a library that records the executed kernel basic
blocks during execution of an arbitrary program in 307 lines
of C++ code. Since the library hooks into the program under
test via the LD_PRELOAD mechanism, we collect covered
basic blocks for a complete process hierarchy. We used this
library to gather the results presented in Sec. 3.
Whether one basic block belongs to the VFS subsystem or
not is determined using addr2line3 on the Linux-kernel ELF
image: It converts an address to one or more kernel source-
file names. Due to function inlining, it may return more than
one source file for a single address. If a source file matches
the following regular expression, a basic block is considered
to belong to the VFS subsystem: /fs/|/mm/|fs\.h|mm\.h.
We also include the mm directory and header files contain-
ing mm.h, because the file-I/O code is located there such as
mm/readahead.c or mm/page-writeback.c.
2Our modifications are based on git commit
056be1b9c8d0c6942412dea4a4a104978a0a9311.
3https://sourceware.org/binutils/docs/binutils/addr2line.html
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Figure 1: Development of the Linux-kernel basic-
block coverage for the programs generated by
syzkaller. The dotted line shows the number of
covered basic blocks out of all 342,732 kernel BBs;
the dashed line shows the fraction of the 75,531
basic blocks of the VFS subsystem. The solid line
shows the number of VFS basic blocks covered by
syzkaller-generated programs that are not already
covered by LTP.
4.2 Results
During its 65-hour run, syzkaller generated 2278 programs
that created a basic-block coverage of 10.0 percent for the
whole kernel and 31.4 percent for the VFS subsystem. More-
over, it covers 9.1 percent of VFS basic blocks that are not
already covered by LTP. Fig. 1 shows the development of these
three basic-block coverage numbers during syzkaller’s run:
The basic-block coverage increases quickly after the start,
and slowly levels off afterwards. The Y axis on the left-hand
side of the plot shows the absolute amount of basic blocks
covered, the Y axis on the right side the percentage of VFS
basic blocks.
The relation between basic blocks belonging to the VFS
subsystem, and those covered by syzkaller’s generated pro-
grams and by LTP’s test suites, is displayed in the area-
equivalent Venn diagram in Fig. 2. The absolute numbers
shown for each area intersection are the absolute number of
basic blocks shared among all intersecting basic-block sets.
To summarize, our results indicate that combining LTP
and syzkaller’s programs to one workload can significantly
improve the overall code coverage for the VFS subsystem by
9.1 percentage points from 34.7 to 43.8 percent.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we showed that using LTP as the only bench-
mark source for LockDoc yields limited kernel-code coverage,
VFS
42446 LTP14083
syzkaller
6090
9332
6856
6100
16897
Figure 2: Set relations between VFS-subsystem ba-
sic blocks, and basic blocks covered respectively by
syzkaller’s generated programs and by LTP’s test
suites.
as it only covers 35 percent of basic blocks for the VFS sub-
system. We repurposed syzkaller to generate programs that
complement LTP to achieve better coverage, with the future-
work goal to improve LockDoc’s precision and bug-finding
effectiveness. We were able to increase the VFS basic-block
coverage by 26.1 percent by combining LTP and syzkaller.
As our next steps, we plan to optimize the resulting bench-
mark suite in terms of runtime with near-zero coverage loss.
We want to discard tests or programs that do not add new
coverage or incur too much runtime.
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